This change adds missing features:
* %[ for pattern matching with a scanset.
* %m for allocation of strings.
* %p for pointers.
* Field width for integers.
The following features remain unimplemented, like with printf(3):
* Floating point support.
* Wide character support.
* %n$ positional parameters.
The code has been completely refactored to be much more maintainable.
The implemented features should now be standards compliant. A large number
of edge cases have been fixed.
The vscanf_callback(3) function has been renamed to vcbscanf(3) and a new
cbscanf(3) function has been added.
The language in POSIX mentioning overriding blocking or ignoring SIGABRT
refers to the inevitability of exiting by SIGABRT if SIGABRT isn't caught or
if the handler does return.
This implementation of abort(3) implements the standard by raising SIGABRT,
allowing the signal to be caught; and if the signal is blocked or ignored or
the handler returns, then exit_thread(2) forcefully exits the process as if
by SIGABRT.
POSIX allows <fcntl.h> to include <sys/stat.h>, but doesn't require it.
There's little reason to do that, since they are separate headers, and
<fcntl.h> just needs the mode_t constants. Fix the code accidentally
relying on <fcntl.h> including <sys/stat.h>. The mode_t constants are now
provided in their own kernel header <sortix/mode.h>.
Additionally fix <sys/stat.h> pulling in all of <sys/types.h>, which is not
allowed by POSIX, which only requires a few types to be declared. Fix the
code accidentally relying on <sys/stat.h> including <sys/types.h>.
Finally fix <dirent.h> pulling in <stdint.h> through <sortix/dirent.h>.
The <sortix/__/dt.h> and <sortix/__/stat.h> headers are no longer required
and their contents have been merged into <sortix/__/dirent.h>.
OpenSSH is allocating a fd_set of exactly the needed size, which leads to
buffer overflows in select(2) when it tries to zero out the fd_set assuming
it is the normal size.
This reverts commit f6cde2d7a6.
gcc detected this header existing and emitted its own limits.h that
included the libc limits.h. This caused the #include_next chain to reach
the end and including the header failed.
Undoing this commit for now until the compiler toolchain is updated to
avoid this problem.
This change refactors the process group implementation and adds support
for sessions. The setsid(2) and getsid(2) system calls were added.
psctl(2) now has PSCTL_TTYNAME, which lets you get the name of a process's
terminal, and ps(1) now uses it.
The initial terminal is now called /dev/tty1.
/dev/tty is now a factory for the current terminal.
A global lock now protects the process hierarchy which makes it safe to
access other processes. This refactor removes potential vulnerabilities
and increases system robustness.
A number of terminal ioctls have been added.
This is a compatible ABI change.
The bootloader will now load the /boot/random.seed file if it exists, in
which case the kernel will use it as the initial kernel entropy. The kernel
warns if no random seed was loaded, unless the --no-random-seed option was
given. This option is used for live environments that inherently have no
prior secret state. The kernel initializes its entropy pool from the random
seed as of the first things, so randomness is available very early on.
init(8) will emit a fresh /boot/random.seed file on boot to avoid the same
entropy being used twice. init(8) also writes out /boot/random.seed on
system shutdown where the system has the most entropy. init(8) will warn if
writing the file fails, except if /boot is a real-only filesystem, and
keeping such state is impossible. The system administrator is then
responsible for ensuring the bootloader somehow passes a fresh random seed
on the next boot.
/boot/random.seed must be owned by the root user and root group and must
have file permissions 600 to avoid unprivileged users can read it. The file
is passed to the kernel by the bootloader as a multiboot module with the
command line --random-seed.
If no random seed is loaded, the kernel attempts a poor quality fallback
where it seeds the kernel arc4random(3) continuously with the current time.
The timing variance may provide some effective entropy. There is no real
kernel entropy gathering yet. The read of the CMOS real time clock is moved
to an early point in the kernel boot, so the current time is available as
fallback entropy.
The kernel access of the random seed module is supposed to be infallible
and happens before the kernel log is set up, but there is not yet a failsafe
API for mapping single pages in the early kernel.
sysupgrade(8) creates /boot/random.seed if it's absent as a temporary
compatibility measure for people upgrading from the 1.0 release. The GRUB
port will need to be upgraded with support for /boot/random.seed in the
10_sortix script. Installation with manual bootloader configuration will
need to load the random seed with the --random-seed command line. With GRUB,
this can be done with: module /boot/random.seed --random-seed
Jonas 'Sortie' Termansen
Nicholas De Nova